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Résumé : En quelques mots, nous présentons les principaux problèmes des
neurosciences cognitives : le problème de la liaison, la localisation, la différen-
ciation–intégration dans le cerveau, les difficultés créées par l’imagerie cé-
rébrale, et l’optimisme versus scepticisme dans les neurosciences cognitives.
Étonnamment, même s’il y a de plus en plus de résultats expérimentaux ces
dernières années, nous ne remarquons pas de réel espoir de résoudre ces diffi-
cultés dans le futur. Les neurosciences cognitives sont basées sur des « corréla-
tions » entre états mentaux et neuronaux, principalement issues de l’imagerie
cérébrale — fMRI de ces deux dernières décennies. Nous voulons suggérer
que ces « corrélations » sont dépourvues d’un quelconque arrière-plan onto-
logique. Dans ce contexte, nous devons répondre à la question suivante : les
neurosciences cognitives sont-elles une vraie science ou une sorte de « nouvelle
ingéniérie » ?
Abstract: In few words, we present the main actual problems of cognitive
neuroscience: the binding problem, localization, differentiation–integration in
the brain, the troubles created by the brain imaging, and optimism vs. skepti-
cism in cognitive neuroscience. Surprisingly, even if there are more and more
experimental results in recent years, we notice no real hope for solving these
troubles in the future. Cognitive neuroscience is a science constructed on “cor-
relations” between mental and neuronal states, mainly furnished by the brain
imaging—fMRI of the last two decades. We want to suggest that “correla-
tion” lacks any ontological background. In this context, we have to answer the
following question: Is cognitive neuroscience a real science or a kind of “new
engineering”?
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1 Cognitive neuroscience today
In this paper, we intend to present a general image of cognitive neuroscience
by means of a brief presentation on the main topics: the binding problem,
localization, differentiation–integration in the brain, the problems of the brain
imaging, and finally the debate “optimism vs. skepticism” in cognitive neu-
roscience as “science”. The state of affair is somehow paradoxical: there have
been incredibly many people working in laboratories of cognitive neuroscience
in the last 20 years, and an avalanche of data has become available based
on a variety of research techniques, such as fMRI, EEG, MEG, and TMG.
In addition, information is widely shared online, many workshops and confer-
ences take place in the world, but paradoxically, the mind–brain problem1 and
other related problems are still unsolved. Therefore, this question arises: “Can
we solve these problems in the future?” This question is strongly related to
another one: “What kind of science is cognitive neuroscience?”
Cognitive neuroscience is a sub-domain of cognitive science. One of the
main problems in cognitive science was the problem of representation2 (and
consciousness)3 during the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. We
recall the main approaches for representation: computationalism, connection-
ism and the dynamical system. More recently, we have seen the emergence
of approaches like embodied and situated cognition. All these approaches
were designed to provide answers to the main questions regarding the exis-
tence of mental representations, their content and format. Paradoxically, even
though the majority of researchers accept some form of reductionism, ques-
tions about the status of the mental have remained, in cognitive science, the
main framework being the correlations of mental states with neuronal patterns
of activation. Nevertheless, these relationships (“correlations”) create serious
problems in cognitive neuroscience. There are important people in cognitive
neuroscience (and quite a lot in philosophy) who reject the identity theory.
In philosophy of cognitive (neuro)science there have been many debates
regarding the relationship (difference) between mental and neuronal states. Is
this difference ontological, epistemological, linguistic or are these states at-
tributes of an unknown substance (Spinoza, and some people in philosophy
of mind today)? The identity theory, the brain producing the mind4 and
different kinds of “emergence” (see [Vacariu 2008]) are the main paradigms
1. In this article, we do not propose a new alternative to the mind–brain problem.
For an alternative to this problem, see [Vacariu 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012] and [Vacariu
& Vacariu 2010].
2. For a summary of this problem, see [Vacariu, Terhesiu & Vacariu 2001].
3. In order to preserve a rigorous framework of this paper, consciousness and the
self will not be discussed in this paper.
4. The philosopher Searle elaborated this approach in 1992 [Searle 1992]. Offering
a lot of arguments from cognitive neuroscience, Frith also believes that the brain
“produces” the mind [Frith 2007].
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that dominate cognitive neuroscience today.5 Throughout the last 15 years,
there has been a significant progress in cognitive neuroscience. Particularly,
the advances in functional neuroimaging technology have offered real hope in
understanding the relationship between mental states and the activity of neu-
ronal patterns. Nevertheless, even if such investigation tools are very helpful,
it seems unlikely that in the near future, researchers will finally find the real
solutions to the main problems of cognitive neuroscience. On the contrary,
the new investigation tools generate more and more controversial answers to
the main problems of cognitive neuroscience. Will these empirical results lead
to the right conclusion about the main problems of cognitive neuroscience?
In the following sections, we will shortly present the main problems of cog-
nitive neuroscience mentioned above, in the end inquiring about the general
framework in which the majority of people work in cognitive neuroscience.
2 The binding problem
One problem in cognitive science is the binding problem. Various researchers
bring up different forms of binding: spatial (location) or temporal, conscious or
unconscious, visual (linking together color, form, motion, size, and location of
a perceptual object or binding various perceptual objects), auditory, cognitive
(explains how a concept is connected to a percept), binding in language under-
standing, in reasoning, cross-modal binding, sensory-motor binding, memory
binding and the causes of a unified conscious experience (for instance, [Velik
2010], [Plate 2007], etc.). Velik writes that the binding mechanism is “almost
everywhere in the brain and in all processing levels”, [Velik 2010].6 Let us an-
alyze the visual binding: any object, for instance, has certain visual features
(color, orientation, motion, texture, and stereoscopic depth) that are linked to
particular neuronal areas. In the past, perception of color was correlated with
V4, motion with MT/V5, and so on. Due to recent discoveries, such corre-
lations are much more problematic. Since we perceive only a singular entity
(the object) with various features, then a mechanism that binds these features
together in a single entity becomes necessary. There are many questions re-
garding the binding problem. For instance, what mental processes (conscious
or unconscious) create the binding among various features? If there are still
quite strong debates regarding the correlations between a particular mental
feature (for instance, color) and some neuronal areas, it is much more difficult
5. The label “cognitive neuroscience” “was coined in the late 1970s in the backseat
of a New York taxi when Mike Gazzaniga was riding with the eminent cognitive
psychologist George Miller to a meeting to gather scientists to join forces to study
how the brain enables the mind”, [D’Esposito 2010, 204].
6. Noticing that the binding problem is “almost everywhere in the brain”, maybe
something is wrong with the framework of thinking that dominates cognitive neuro-
science. We have to point out that some people consider that the binding problem is
a pseudo-problem (see [Vacariu & Vacariu 2011]).
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to answer the question “What neuronal mechanism has to be correlated with
the unity of a perceived object?”
Let us introduce in a few words the two approaches regarding this prob-
lem. The first alternative is the quite old Treisman’s feature-integration the-
ory (FIT), the second is the synchronization or temporal coding theory (or
temporal binding) that is still controversial. In Treisman’s FIT, attention
plays an essential role in the binding process, but attention is a very unclear
notion in cognitive neuroscience today. Anyway, Treisman herself modified
(“improved”) her approach during years (maybe such modifications could be
viewed as more and more complicated Ptolemaic epicycles). Among many
critics against FIT, Velik recalls that, in some situations, the object recogni-
tion does not depend on top-down processes [Velik 2010]. According to Gray,
there have “to exist mechanisms that act prior to attention and also serve to
attract it” Gray (1999) in [Velik 2010, 998]. There are some experiments argu-
ing that attention has no role in binding processes. The features remain bound
in short-term memory without the need of attention [Delvenne, Cleeremans
& Laloyaux 2010, 108]. Making some experiments on the delay recall task,
[Gajewski & Brockmole 2006] try to clarify the relationship between attention
and visual working memory. Treisman believes that attention is indeed nec-
essary for the binding object features and has a role for the information that
is accounted within visual working memory. Also without attention, there are
illusory conjunctions. Nevertheless, without attention, we do not remember
features independently but “integrated objects are stored in visual working
memory without need for continued attention” [Gajewski & Brockmole 2006,
581]. Some people believe that, in visual working memory, the memory pro-
cesses retain the object as a whole or it is deleted from memory [Gajewski &
Brockmole 2006, 586]. Others consider that the binding process does not need
a special mechanism of selective attention [Vul & Rich 2010, 1173]. Treisman’s
FIT is still very controversial in our days.
Quite many scientists (von der Malsburg, Engel, Singer, Fries, etc.) con-
sider that synchronization of the neuronal processes is the real solution for
the binding problem. The perceptual features of an object are bound through
the synchronized oscillations. It seems that the oscillation theory is the most
accepted alternative one today, even if there are quite many critics against it.
From our viewpoint, we consider that maybe we can link synchronization with
the processes of consciousness, but it does not solve the binding problem. The
research in recent years produced more confusion and unclear results regard-
ing the role of oscillations in cognitive/consciousness processes. Tallon-Baudry
mentions that, in the first period of research, each frequency band was associ-
ated with a cognitive function or state: delta waves were associated with sleep,
theta band with memory, alpha wave with vigilance fluctuations (or with men-
tal imagery and other mental processes, as suggested by [Baars & Gage 2010,
270]), beta and gamma ranges with active awake stages and later with feature
binding, attention, and memory [Tallon-Baudry 2010, 239], [Tallon-Baudry
2009]. The associations between mental functions/states and oscillations have
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recently changed quite dramatically. We can quote Tallon-Baudry and assume
that “the functional role of oscillatory synchrony in distinct frequency bands
may simply depend on the functional specialization of the area that generates
these oscillations (Tallon et al. 2005), much as the functional significance of
ERPs depends on the areas that generate them” [Tallon-Baudry 2010, 240].7
Tallon-Baudry considers that, in our days, there is no strict correspondence
between a frequency band and a cognitive process [Tallon-Baudry 2010, 239,
325], [Tallon-Baudry 2009]. The conclusion is that, in cognitive neuroscience,
there is no alternative to the binding problem accepted by the majority of
researchers.
3 Localization
The avalanche of empirical results furnished by fMRI created a tremendous
impulse in cognitive neuroscience in the last two decades. Between two ex-
treme theories (the grand cell theory vs. the holistic theory), based on recent
research, the majority of people consider that each mental state (a feature of a
perceived object, for instance color) has to be correlated with some distributed
neuronal areas. From hundreds of articles published each year on fMRI, we
will briefly analyze an experiment with surprising empirical results in mirror-
ing the actual state of affairs regarding the famous notion of localization. In a
perceptual scene, the human observer can detect various objects in a specific
area (segmentation, the notion used by Bartels). The properties of each per-
ceptual object are, for instance, its boundaries, color, motion, direction and
distance to the observer. The researchers need to solve the following problem:
what neural mechanisms create the links among segmentation, feature bind-
ing and attentional selection [Bartels 2009, 300]? Based on recent empirical
evidence, Bartels claims that even at the early visual cortex (V1 and V2) such
connectivity takes place! Subsets of neurons from V1 and V2 are responsible
for the border-ownership of edges and the same subsets are directly modulated
by top-down attention [Bartels 2009, 300]. However, neurons from V2 are also
responsible for color and motion.8 Bartels indicates that the properties of a
given object far exceed the small field of view of V2 neurons through feedback
mediated by myelinated (fast conducting fibers of neurons with much larger
receptive fields, similar with the neurons from V4). Interestingly, this feedback
7. For very recent critics of the synchronized oscillations see, for instance, [Dong,
Mihalas, Qiu et al. 2008]. O’Herron and von der Heydt acknowledge that the neu-
ronal processes responsible for the continuity of human perceptual representations
are unknown [O’Herron & von der Heydt 2011]! In fact, we have here not only the
binding problem but also the ‘endurance’ problem of mental representations. Both
problems are still unsolved in our days. More details about the temporal coding
theory, see [Vacariu & Vacariu 2011].
8. Haynes mentions that “even if V1 does not encode colour sensations, it could still
encode other, simple features of conscious experience, such as brightness or contrast
sensations” [Haynes 2009, 198].
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mediated not only the spatial binding in V2, but also color and motion (“fea-
tures that are processed within V2’s anatomically segregated thin and thick
stripes, respectively”) [Bartels 2009]. Against the synchronization alternative,
other experiments suggest that the same neurons (mainly V2) mediate the
border ownership and the basic visual features. Moreover,
No evidence has been found that synchronous firing “tags” same-
border neurons, as classic theories on the binding problem have
proposed [...]; instead, this seems to be mediated by a plain
enhancement of the neural firing rate [...]. Nevertheless, those
select neurons that are capable of coding for border-ownership
have the distinct hallmark of increased synchronous firing that
does not indicate same/different border coding, but that indicates
that they are part of a network with far-reaching connectivity.
[Bartels 2009, 301]
Bartels concludes that these experiments show that the early visual cortex
mediates border-ownership, feature binding and object-based attentional selec-
tion. In this context, let us introduce the very interesting experiment realized
by Seymour et al. ([Seymour, Clifford, Logothetis et al. 2009], Bartels signed
this article, too) regarding localization of color, motion and the conjunction
between color and motion. They argue that both features are processed by
distinct neuronal areas: the color is processed by the blobs V1, thin strips of
V2 and V4, while the motion is processed by the layer 4B of V1, thick stripes
of V2 and V5/MT. Thus, motion and color seem to be segregated at the cel-
lular level, lesions studies (lesions to V4 impair color perception but spare
motion perception, lesions to the V5/MT impair motion perception but spare
color perception) confirming this segregation [Seymour, Clifford, Logothetis
et al. 2009, 177]. The question is if we accept such a functional segregation,
then how and where does the binding of these features occur?9 Seymour et
al. conducted an essential visual experiment. The human subjects perceive
two transparent motion stimuli, each stimulus has the same two circle-colors
and two motions, the difference being the direction of movement of circle-color
(clockwise and counterclockwise). They indicate that “the double-conjunction
stimuli would be indistinguishable without conjunction-specific responses, as
all four feature specific units are active in both conditions” [Seymour, Clifford,
Logothetis et al. 2009, 178]. Based on the results of fMRI, the main conclusion
of this experiment is that the primary visual cortex includes information not
only about motion direction and color hue but also about conjunction of these
two features:
Whereas some areas showed better performance as well as biases
for decoding one feature over the other (e.g., V5/MT+ for motion;
9. It “remains a matter of debate whether visual-feature binding is mediated by a
temporal code [...], by communication between visual areas [...], by feedback connec-
tions to early visual areas [...], or by representations at higher, cognitive stages [...]”
[Seymour, Clifford, Logothetis et al. 2009, 177].
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V4 for color), information about both features and their conjunc-
tion was present in nearly every visual cortical region. [Seymour,
Clifford, Logothetis et al. 2009, 178]
However, the authors of this work emphasize the limits of fMRI through
spatial-temporal resolution. Whitney emphasizes some problems with
Seymour et al.’s “clever technique”: beside lesions, we have to take into ac-
count the psychological and physiological models of binding based on higher-
level mechanisms; furthermore, the feedbacks from fronto-parietal attentional
region may create the conjunctions; under the illusions framework, it is possi-
ble for the mechanism of feature binding not to be recruited for unambiguous
visual stimuli [Whitney 2009, R252–R253]. Seymour and his colleagues are
aware of the overall limitations of neuroimaging technologies, such as fMRI
and PET, as these machines might show us only a part of what actually hap-
pens in the brain.
There are also other elements that could further complicate the whole
image of localization and even of the binding problem, such as the role of
neurotransmitters, the feedback from different parts of the brain, the synchro-
nized oscillations, famous Edelman’s “re-entrant processes”, Raichle’s “default
network” [Raichle 2006], [Raichle & Mintun 2006], [Raichle & Snyder 2009]
and Libet’s “cerebral mental field” [Libet 2006]. We have to be aware of the
particular conditions of observing some processes/entities, either mental or
neural, when we analyze the results of the neuroimaging technology. The con-
jecture regarding the conjunction between color and motion based solely on
the firing neurons might be hazardous, as neurons are probably doing “more
than fire spikes”, as Baars and Gage observe [Baars & Gage 2010, 96].10 Like
the binding problem, localization is constructed on the same problematic no-
tion of “correlations”. Therefore, localization is itself a problematic notion11
and hence we have to answer the following question: can a real science be
constructed on “localizations”?
4 Optimism in cognitive neuroscience
One of the most important philosophers in cognitive (neuro)science, Bechtel is
an optimist, even if a couple of years ago, he admitted that the process of per-
ceiving a simple object had to be correlated with more than 30 neuronal areas
[Bechtel 2008]. Bechtel was convinced that localization (and “decomposition”)
10. Derrfuss and Mar draw the attention upon the fact that we are already “lost in
localization” [Derrfuss & Mar 2009]; Globus and O’Caroll propose “holonomy” instead
of localization [Globus & O’Carroll 2010].
11. “What is the point of having all of these retinotopic maps? (And there are
known to be many more than these three!) Does each area—V1, V2, and V3—serve
a different function? Do they represent different properties of the visual world?”
[Banich & Compton 2011, 161].
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of mental states in the brain would be successful in the future, pleading for
the heuristic theory of identity [Bechtel 2008]. Later, Bechtel considered that
the notions of “localization” and “brain areas” needed to be re-conceptualized
[Bechtel 2013]. His new alternative is a combination of mechanisms with the
dynamical system approach, i.e., the dynamical mechanisms, and the expla-
nation of “endogenous activity of the brain” [Bechtel 2013]. He believes that
in order to explain cognition through the neuronal processes, we need to clar-
ify this intrinsic activity of the brain (related to Raichle’s default network).
Bechtel already tried to combine reductionism with emergence [Bechtel 2008]
or integration with differentiation of operations [Bechtel 2009]. In order to
support these ideas, Bechtel mentions Sporns and Zwi’s (2004) “dual role of
cortical connectivity”: the functional specificity of certain cortical areas that
manipulate specific information and the integration of this kind of information
[Bechtel 2013]. Bechtel insists in combining integration with parallel localiza-
tion of certain various functions. From our viewpoint, we notice that the
functional specificity and the integration are quite similar notions to notions
as the binding problem and localization.
Continuing the optimism paradigm, we analyze the latest work of peo-
ple from Gallant’s laboratory [Nishimoto, Vu, Naselaris et al. 2011].12 In
2011, Nishimoto et al. (Gallant’s laboratory) published an article about a
new method for “mind reading” (this work being considered among the best
achievements in the last 15 years in cognitive neuroscience) [Nishimoto, Vu,
Naselaris et al. 2011].13 With a computer program and based on the fMRI
results, the researchers constructed a quantitative model of brain activity.
Using the brain activity measurements, Nishimoto et al. reconstruct natural
movies seen by three human subjects. It is the first study of reconstructing
dynamic stimuli (natural movies) through the brain activity using fMRI. In
the past, only static pictures were reconstructed, the main problem being that
the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals measured by fMRI are much
slower than the neuronal activity in relationship with dynamic stimuli. This
new “motion-energy encoding” model furnishes a mapping between stimuli and
evoked fMRI signals. It has to match two components, visual motion infor-
mation and slow hemodynamic mechanisms, in order to “recover fine temporal
information” from slow BOLD signals [Nishimoto, Vu, Naselaris et al. 2011,
1641]. The researchers of Gallantlab focus on signals received by the early
visual neural areas V1 (the functionality of this neural area being quite well
studied), V2 and V3 (all areas being in occipitotemporal cortex lobes). The
measured training data of brain activity (BOLD signals evoked by 7,200 color
natural movies, each movie presented once) used to match an encoding model
for each voxel from posterior and ventral occipitotemporal visual cortex. Then
12. About the previous work of the same laboratory, see their work and Uttal’s
investigation [Uttal 2011].
13. On the Gallantlab’s webpage (gallantlab.org), “Research section”, we can see
one of the latest news: “Our work on reconstructing visual experiences evoked by
natural movies was selected as one of Time Magazine’s 50 Best Inventions of 2011.”
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they use a Bayesian decoder to reconstruct movies from the evoked BOLD sig-
nals, i.e., combining the “estimated encoding models with a sampled natural
movie prior, in order to produce reconstructions of natural movies from BOLD
signals” [Nishimoto, Vu, Naselaris et al. 2011, 1642]. Comparing the fMRI data
and the details of each movie, the computer program constructs “dictionaries”
for shape, edge and motion. Each voxel has such a dictionary. The subject
watches a second set of movies and new fMRI data are collected. Using the
computational models constructed on the first set of movies, the second set
of movies is reconstructed only from the second fMRI data [Nishimoto, Vu,
Naselaris et al. 2011]. Using “ ‘pick a card, any card’ magic trick”, people
working in Gallantlab do not even try to offer an alternative to the binding
problem.14 Even if Uttal admires Gallantlab’s work, he concludes that mostly
they were able to show distinctive fMRI responses from a number of visual
cortical areas (V1, V2, V3, V3A, V3B, V4, as well as the lateral and anterior
occipital cortex) that could be used to identify images from the training set.
What they did not do was to take fMRI images and directly plot from them
pictures of the original stimuli; once again, they selected pictures from their
library based on the pattern of activations. This is not reconstruction per se,
but a selection from a predetermined “deck of cards” [Uttal 2011, 114]. On
the same line of research, using “diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI), an MRI
technique that measures the propensity of water to travel along myelinated
axons”, Saygin et al. show that only the activation of the individual’s pat-
tern of structural connectivity (fusiform face area, FFA) predicts the function
of face selectivity [Saygin, Osher, Koldewyn et al. 2012].15 In other words,
brain structure (extrinsic connectivity) determines function. Therefore, there
is a strong relationship between structural connectivity and function. This
relationship has the same difficulties as the binding problem and localization.
14. In their previous works, they write that this problem “is analogous to the classic
‘pick a card, any card’ magic trick” [Uttal 2011, 113].
15. In a very recent article, using diffusion spectrum MRI (DSI), Van Wedeen et
al. offer a completely new image regarding the anatomical structure of the brain
that is wired in a rectangular 3D grid structure [Wedeen, Rosene, Wang et al. 2012]!
DSI acquires a detailed image of the three dimensional pattern of water diffusion
by measuring diffusion in dozens to hundreds of directions. “Far from being just a
tangle of wires, the brain’s white-matter connections turn out to be more like ribbon
cables—folding 2D sheets of parallel neuronal fibers that cross paths at right angles,
like the warp and weft of a fabric.” Essentially, this grid structure “is continuous
and consistent at all scales and across humans and other primate species” [Wedeen,
Rosene, Wang et al. 2012]. So, the brain is not a mechanism as complex as we
have thought! On the contrary, as a result of evolution, the brain is quite a simple
machinery. Paradoxically, even within this new view, the mind–body problem has no
chance to be solved in cognitive neuroscience or philosophy of mind in our days.
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5 Skepticism in cognitive neuroscience
Emblematic for the contemporary skepticism regarding the localization of cer-
tain mental functions through the imagistic procedures is Uttal (who is not
a philosopher, but a researcher in cognitive neuroscience). His main book
against localization was published in 2001, but Uttal pushed further these
ideas in a book published in 2011. Even if he accepts the identity theory,
Uttal illustrates many arguments against localization. In an ontological pos-
tulate, Uttal considers that the mental processes are the results of interactions
from the micro-level of the brain. Since fMRI and PET “localize” the mental
functions at the “macro-level” (the large neural patterns), the results are com-
pletely wrong [Uttal 2011, 11]. Through a corollary of this postulate, Uttal
believes that “the neural network approach is computationally intractable” and
thus the mind–body problem cannot be solved [Uttal 2011, 26]. Moreover, he
undertakes a general view in cognitive neuroscience that the “brain activity
associated with mental activity is broadly distributed on and in the brain”
[Uttal 2011, 45].16 We can see an epistemological-ontological framework that
shows us that the neural networks are indeed “computationally intractable”.
We can find no mental computations within the brain.
Uttal believes that localization through fMRI and PET is the wrong
method of identifying mental states. Uttal claims in his first epistemologi-
cal postulate for neuroscience that the “brain activity associated with mental
activity is broadly distributed on and in the brain. The idea of phrenologi-
cal localization must be rejected and replaced with a theory of broadly dis-
tributed neural systems accounting for our mental activity” [Uttal 2011, 45].17
For Uttal, the main reason of this point is that the actual tools operate at
the wrong “level of analysis” and the mind would be better grasped not at
16. Important is that the “a priori no brain imaging or electrical recording activity,
no matter how direct they may seem to be in recording the activity of the brain, can in
principle provide solutions to the mind–brain problem” [Uttal 2011, 26]. Moreover,
“many different cognitive processes can activate the same area or system of areas
of the brain” [Uttal 2011, 55] and “many different regions of the brain have been
activated during any kind of cognitive task” [Uttal 2011, 45].
17. “All brain regions are involved in learning, memory, and plasticity, which can
be considered as different methods for evoking long-lasting adaptive changes in the
brain” [Baars & Gage 2010, 541]. Lost in localization! Anyway, we have to link this
widely distributed neuronal network correlated with any mental state with Baars’
“global workspace” [Baars & Gage 2010] supported by Dehaene’s global neuronal
workspace and by Raichle’s default mode network: “But, just as we will not under-
stand evoked activity without first understanding intrinsic activity, so we will not
understand consciousness without first understanding non-conscious activity, for in
both instances the latter dominates the former” [Raichle 2011, 155]. Haynes also
believes that Baars’ global workspace theory seems to be the best alternative since
many experiments have showed that the distributed areas are involved for each mental
task [Haynes 2009]. Following the same route of holism, Bressler and Menon strongly
argue that cognition is much better explained at “large-scale networks” [Bressler &
Menon 2010].
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macroscopic but microscopic level. Against localization, he is convinced that
almost certainly, any mental task/function/state (sensation, perception, sim-
ple thought) involves the entire brain. The parts of the brain are all somehow
interconnected; it is not possible to isolate the neural patterns that corre-
spond to any cognitive process; consciousness and all its relatives (thinking,
reasoning, decision-making, problem solving, and intelligence) are the most
problematic notions in cognitive neuroscience, etc. There are no clear defi-
nitions of some mental states like emotion, attention or consciousness18 and
probably such states are general functions and not modules of cognition. In
conclusion, we can suggest that Uttal’s perspective is the strongest skepticism
in cognitive neuroscience.
Hardcastle criticizes the modularity of mind hypotheses [Hardcastle 2007],
[Hardcastle & Stewart 2002]. The main attack is not only against the fact that
there are no empirical data for this strategy but also against the theoretical
framework. These authors believe that none of those three methods (local-
ization and single cell recordings, lesion studies and the assumption of brain
constancy, functional imaging), in which the neuroscientists believe in finding
the modularity of the brain, offers viable results.19 Hardcastle raises many es-
sential questions on perception, memory, attention, combination of information
from various sensory modalities, localization/reduction, methodologies in cog-
nitive neuroscience, etc. It is not surprising that researchers become more and
more interested in developmental neurobiology (an area that becomes more
and more molecular) or in the interactions between genes and environment to
explain the mysteries of cognition. The main question remains “how the brain
coordinates itself across neurons to produce global effects” [Hardcastle 2007,
298]. If a specialist in philosophy of cognitive neuroscience asks such ques-
tions after so many years of working in this field, we have to inquire about
the paradigm of thinking in which the majority of people work in cognitive
neuroscience.
In the past, it was believed that local filed potential (LFPs) and spik-
ing were correlated with bold-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response. The
work of Logothetis and collaborators showed, among the first, that in some
cases, there are clear and strong LFPs signals but the spikes are absent
(Logothetis et al. (2001); Goense and Logothetis (2008) in [Logothetis 2008]).
Moreover, Logothetis claims that even if the brain’s architecture is modu-
lar, we would never be able to map mind modules onto brain structures, be-
cause a unified mind has no components to speak of” [Logothetis 2008, 869].
Obviously, the traditional “input-elaboration-output” scheme (corresponding
to the “perception-cognition-action model”) is “probably a misleading oversim-
plification” [Logothetis 2008, 872]. Moreover, in 2008, Logothetis also stressed
18. For instance, Uttal quotes Vimal (2009) who offers “a list of 40 different mean-
ings of consciousness and argued that even this list was not exhaustive” [Uttal 2011,
271].
19. In an article from 2009, Bechtel mentions the same methods in favour of local-
ization!
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that the fMRI cannot grasp the activity of “silent neurons”, activity that is im-
portant for many cognitive processes. Under such conditions, we wonder once
more whether we can localize some mental functions in the brain. Logothetis’
conclusion is that the multimodal approach for studying the brain’s function
is more necessary than ever.
Another already classical example of questioning the functioning of fMRI
is the work of Vul et al. [Vul, Harris, Winkielman et al. 2009]. Vul et al.
investigate the correlations between the behavioral and self-report measures
of the personality or emotion and the measures of brain activation obtained
using fMRI and show that
these correlations are higher than should be expected given the
(evidently limited) reliability of both fMRI and personality mea-
sures. [Vul, Harris, Winkielman et al. 2009, 274]
Vul et al. inquire about the questions and methods used in 54 articles! The
authors of these papers try to find certain empirical data in order to
bridge the divide between mind and brain: extremely high corre-
lations between measures of individual differences relating to per-
sonality, emotion and social cognition, and measures of brain ac-
tivity obtained using fMRI. [Vul, Harris, Winkielman et al. 2009,
274]
Without analyzing this investigation in detail, we introduce the conclusion
of this article: Vul et al. claim that such correlations are “impossible high”.
Even if Vul et al. urge the authors of the articles under their investigations
to correct the results of such correlations, we believe that these correlations
would never be perfect!20 In our days, the most important and used method
of investigating the brain for explaining the mind is neuroimaging (mainly
non-invasive fMRI, but also PET, MEG, etc.). The neuroimaging tools help
the researchers in cognitive neuroscience associate particular neuronal areas
with cognitive functions. One of the problems with such associations is that
we cannot be sure that the cognitive process we associate with some neuronal
areas is totally isolated from other cognitive processes [D’Esposito 2010, 207].
As a result, observed neural activity may be the result of some
confounding neural computation that is not itself necessary for
the execution of the cognitive process seemingly under study.
[D’Esposito 2010, 208]
As D’Esposito emphasizes, no method in cognitive neuroscience is perfect!
20. Uttal mentions quite many people that draw attention to the limits (theoretical
and empirical) of fMRI [Uttal 2011]. In a very recent article, against “blobology”
(Poldrack’s expression for localization of function in some particular blobs), Poldrack
pleads for an absolute methodological rigor in using fMRI [Poldrack 2011].
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Another important problem in cognitive neuroscience is Raichle’s “default
network” [Raichle 2011] or the “dark energy of the brain”21 [Raichle 2006],
[Raichle & Mintun 2006]. The problem is that the brain “apparently uses
most of its energy for functions unaccounted for—dark energy, in astronom-
ical terms” [Raichle 2006, 1249]. In the last years, using PET and fMRI,
researchers realized that the energy necessary for the brain to manage the de-
mands of external environment is less than 1%. In other words, the brain’s
metabolism and its circulation for specific mental tasks in interaction with the
environment require only a small part of the energy consumed by the brain.
More exactly, it is about “the cost of intrinsic functional activity which far
exceeds that of evoked activity and dominates the overall cost of brain func-
tion” [Raichle & Snyder 2009, 85]. But what does “intrinsic activity” mean?
Raichle analyzes some possible answers to this question: spontaneous cogni-
tion, intrinsic functional activity facilitates responses to stimuli, interpreting,
responding to and predicting environmental demands. Such a default function
is a property of all brain areas. “Task-specific decreases from a resting state
occur in many areas of the brain” [Raichle & Snyder 2009, 85]. Essentially,
“the spatially coherent spontaneous activity of the fMRI BOLD signal persists
despite major changes in levels of consciousness” [Raichle & Snyder 2009]. The
problem is that fMRI and PET do not furnish information about this intrinsic
energy of the brain. So, what kind of explanation do we get with fMRI tools?
Obviously, we do not have space in one article to analyze all major problems
in cognitive neuroscience, but we just mention other problems. An essential
problem is the relationship between sensorial inputs and perceptual states
like the “constructive perception” or “perceptual filling in”: the brain “fills in
perception of the blind spot” [Baars & Gage 2010, 186]. The brain fills in
color, patterns and motion! We perceive in full color and high resolution only
at the center of gaze [Baars & Gage 2010, 158]. Regarding the color perceptual
images, the fovea “subtends about four degrees of visual arc” [Baars & Gage
2010, 48].22 However, we still do not understand how the “position-invariant
recognition arises from ventral stream cells that have position preferences”
[Banich & Compton 2011, 192]. The authors debate on the object recognition
in relationship with the viewpoint-invariant or the viewpoint-dependent: what
is the relationship between the neuronal patterns and the viewpoint from which
the object is perceived and how does the brain create a 3D representation of an
object (recognizable from any viewpoint) from 2D information received from
the retina? How do we draw the line between what “we” really perceive and
what is filled in by the brain? How could we combine the part that the eyes and
the brain really “perceive” and what is filled in by the “brain”? Interestingly,
21. Raichle’s “default network” or “dark energy of the brain” is not something sceptic
in cognitive neuroscience, but something we cannot explain. He adds that “just as
we will not understand evoked activity without first understanding intrinsic activity,
so we will not understand consciousness without first understanding non-conscious
activity, for in both instances the latter dominates the former” [Raichle 2011, 155].
22. About the same problem, see [Raichle 2011, 149].
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it is the evolution of Brodmann areas during the last decades: today, there
are around 100 Brodmann areas recognized in cognitive neuroscience. These
areas are correlated with different specialized functions of the cortex (visual,
auditory, motor, language, cognition). Nevertheless, in order to correlate such
mental functions with neural areas, we have to take into account the white
matter and subcortical regions.
While the cortex is vital for cognitive functions, it interacts con-
stantly with major ‘satellite’ organs, notably the thalamus, basal
ganglia, cerebellum, hippocampus, and limbic regions, among oth-
ers. [Baars & Gage 2010, 127]
It seems that localization becomes almost an impossible task in cognitive neu-
roscience.
Finally, we would like to point out some statements from a very recent
handbook on cognitive neuroscience [Banich & Compton 2011] that is em-
blematic for the actual state of affair in this domain. The main idea is that
regarding many topics, the authors underline many times that the results are
still controversial.23 For instance, Banich and Compton analyze the role of V4
for coding color. They consider that the area V4 is the most activated one for
coding color, but there are other neuronal areas involved in this task as well.
Therefore, regarding V4 as the area coding color (and nothing else) is “far too
simplistic” [Banich & Compton 2011, 163].24 Moreover, a difficult problem to
solve is the integration of signals received by different modalities (for instance
visual and auditory inputs) and “there is still much to be learned about how
the sensory modalities interact” [Banich & Compton 2011, 173]. More and
more researchers in cognitive neuroscience consider that “multi-modality inte-
gration” is necessary: the combination of the results offered by two apparatus,
for instance, fMRI and EEG or fMRI and PET. With such combinations, we
get a more “complete characterization of the different aspects of the brain
activity during cognitive processing” [Laureys, Boly & Tononi 2009]. The con-
clusion is that all the problems investigated in this paper are caused by a
notion, “correlations”, that reflects a mixture of entities/processes of different
23. We give some examples from Banich and Compton’s book: the area V4 “has
been posited to play a special role in color perception, although that claim has been
controversial” [Banich & Compton 2011, 161]. There are many such expressions
throughout the whole book. For instance, in the first chapters: [Banich & Compton
2011, 153, 159, 161, 163, 182, 214, etc.].
24. “[...] (cells in V4 of the monkey are also responsive to properties other than
color, such as line orientation, depth, and spatial frequency)” and “cells in areas V2
and V3 are sensitive to color” and finally “but the exact nature of the association—
how to define different subregions, and what unique contribution each one makes
to color perception—is still subject to debate among vision scientists” [Banich &
Compton 2011, 163].
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particular sciences, neuroscience and psychology. In this context, what could
a philosopher recommend to the researchers in cognitive neuroscience?25
6 Cognitive neuroscience: science or a kind
of “new engineering”?
In each “special science” (for instance, physics, neuroscience, psychology), we
can find different theories/approaches (quantum mechanics, Einstein’s theory
of relativity, Fodor’s LOT, some neuronal perspectives) that deal with partic-
ular entities (micro- and macro-particles, neurons and mental representations)
and laws.26 Such particular entities have questionable (relative or not) onto-
logical status. Cognitive neuroscience deals with “correlations” that reflect the
relationship between entities (mental and neuronal states) with questionable
ontological status. Leaving aside the necessity of any argument whatsoever,
it is quite clear that “correlation” has no ontological background, not even
“questionable”/relative ontological background. Thus, cognitive neuroscience
has no ontological entities and no laws. Therefore, from a standard framework
(in which we define all other particular sciences like physics, neuroscience, cog-
nitive psychology), cognitive neuroscience is not a real science but a pseudo-
25. Bassett and Gazzaniga relate the “complex system theory” with the notion of
“levels” and “emergence” as a new framework for explaining the brain [Bassett &
Gazzaniga 2005]. Introducing quite debatable notions like “emergence” and “levels”,
the authors conclude that (cognitive) neuroscience “desperately needs a stronger the-
oretical framework to solve the problems that it has taken on for itself” [Bassett &
Gazzaniga 2005, 208]. (Gazzaniga also stated this kind of investigation in his very
interesting paper from 2010.) If Gazzaniga (one of the father of cognitive neuro-
science) asserts that neuroscientists need “desperately” a new theoretical framework
and Bechtel (one of the best philosopher in cognitive (neuro)science) changes quite
dramatically his optimism position, then it seems that something is wrong with the
framework of cognitive neuroscience!
26. In a famous article from 1972, Anderson (Nobel Prize for physics) shows that
reductionism is not appropriate to explain some physical phenomena [Anderson 1972].
That is, the explanations/theories of some macro-physical phenomena cannot be re-
duced to the quantum mechanics. In philosophy of mind, we can notice Fodor’s
article (two years after Anderson’s paper). If, for Anderson, we can talk about a
kind of organizational non-reductionism, Fodor establishes somehow a linguistic non-
reductionism. Each special science (for instance, neuroscience or psychology) has its
own taxonomy that cannot be reduced to basic science (physics) and we cannot mix
the taxonomy of neuroscience with that of psychology [Fodor 1974]. Special sciences
exist not because “of the nature of our relation to the world, but because of the
way the world is put together: not all the kinds (not all the classes of things and
events about which there are important, counterfactuals supporting generalizations to
make) are, or correspond to, physical kinds.” [Fodor 1974, 439]. Much more recently,
Piccinini believes that “when it comes to explaining cognitive capacities, computa-
tional explanation is proprietary to psychology—it does not belong in neuroscience”
[Piccinini 2006, 343].
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science created by a mixture of information that describe entities/processes
that belong to different “special sciences”. In this context, it is clear that the
enormous amount of correlations of the last decade created almost congestion
for the young researchers. Maybe we can regard cognitive neuroscience as a
new kind of “new engineering”. However, we can make an analogy between
brain imaging (the main tool of cognitive neuroscience in our days) and “neu-
ral networks” (a method in vogue between 1990 and 2005). Even if, since the
end of the 1980s, connectionism has been quite important in cognitive science,
the interest on neuronal networks among researchers strongly declined in the
last years. We think that the brain imaging is in a similar situation: a lot
of enthusiasm today, a decline tomorrow. Therefore, we predict that brain
imaging or mind reading will have the same trajectory as connectionism: the
mind reading (in particular) and cognitive neuroscience (in general) will be-
come just a kind of new engineering. The main reason for this prediction is
that the brain imaging does not really explain cognition nor the true relation-
ship between mind and brain.27 Like connectionism, cognitive neuroscience is
not science, but only a kind of “new engineering”.28
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